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Mission	impossible:	calculating	the	economic	costs	of
Brexit
Much	of	the	2016	referendum	debate	focused	on	the	costs	involved	in	a	potential	Brexit.	The	‘fatalists’
claimed	that	the	losses	would	be	huge	and	felt	immediately	after	the	UK	had	taken	the	decision	to	leave
the	EU.	As	time	progressed,	a	more	‘moderate’	view	prevailed	postulating	that	the	costs	would	not	be
instantly	perceptible,	but	would	crystallise	only	over	the	medium-run.	However,	according	to	Eddie
Gerba	(LSE),	the	reality	is	much	more	complex	and	the	degree	of	uncertainty	in	estimating	the	true
economic	costs	has	been	much	higher	than	any	of	the	sides	in	the	debate	were	ever	willing	to	admit.
As	a	matter	of	fact,	estimating	the	costs	surrounding	a	future	stochastic	event	(or	structural	break)	is	as	easy	as
predicting	next	year’s	weather.	Financial	mathematicians	know	this	matter	better	than	anyone.	Considering	that	there
has	not	been	a	previous	exit	from	the	European	Union	(nor	in	any	highly	integrated	economic	area),	estimating	the
full	costs	was	never	going	to	be	possible.	The	attempts	that	were	made	prior	to	the	referendum	involved	many	and
heavy	assumptions,	including	strong	premises	regarding	the	reaction	of	the	other	economies	and	trading	partners
within	the	EU,	and	beyond.	Moreover,	the	issue	involves	a	multitude	of	aspects	beyond	those	strict	trade-related,
such	as	productivity	and	competitive	edge,	labour	mobility,	education,	firm	complementarity	across	borders,
macroeconomic	interdependence,	(macroeconomic)	policy	alignments,	financial	interdependence,	financial	market
flexibility,	financial	innovation,	liquidity,	systemic	risks	and	financial	stability,	or	prudential	policy	effectiveness.
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Yet	despite	this	cloud	of	uncertainty,	there	are	some	insights	from	the	literature	that	we	can	use	to	make	the
challenge	more	manageable,	specifically	when	it	comes	to	the	macro-financial	aspects	at	the	heart	of	Brexit.	The	first
and	maybe	most	obvious	is	the	competitive	edge	of	the	financial	services	sector,	and	the	status	of	London	as	a
financial	‘hub’.	There	has	been	a	lot	of	discussion	on	the	potential	costs	from	the	loss	of	a	privileged	access	to	EU
financial	markets	(the	so-called	EU	passport).	While	that	is	true,	and	there	may	be	some	considerable	(opportunity)
costs	from	that,	the	bigger	cost	is	the	lost	opportunity	to	take	part	(and	advantage	of)	the	EU’s	banking	and	capital
markets	union.	In	particular,	the	flexibility,	innovation,	unique	regulation,	and	privileged	access	to	financing	and
counterparties	from	the	other	EU	member	states	would	have	been	highly	beneficial	for	the	UK	financial	system.
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That	said,	we	must	remember	that	the	‘Big	Bang’	in	the	UK	financial	system	occurred	during	the	mid-80’s,	and	well
before	the	EMU,	integration	of	capital	markets,	and	the	opening	up	of	financial	markets	in	the	rest	of	Europe.
Relocation	of	European	(investment)	banks	and	other	financial	institutions	to	London	was,	at	large,	prior	to	any	of
those	events.	Moreover,	the	competitive	advantage	of	the	UK	financial	sector	goes	much	beyond	the	EU	market
access.	Not	only	is	there	a	level	of	expertise	and	specialisation	in	market	financing	in	London	that	is	not	comparable
to	any	other	European	city,	but	there	is	a	well	developed	global	stock	market	(the	other	LSE),	a	whole	network	of
legal	services	and	juridical	expertise	to	support	financial	transactions	and	services,	a	renown	higher-education
system	with	strong	links	to	the	City,	and	a	physical-technological	infrastructure	that	backs	the	hub.	Considering	that	it
took	quite	a	long	time	to	build	and	cultivate	these	components,	it	is	hard	to	imagine	that	simply	because	of	an	exit	(or
a	rearrangement	in	the	relation	between	the	UK	and	EU),	financial	institutions	will	relocate	to	other	European
destinations	where	some	(or	all)	of	these	components	are	lacking.	That	is	why	there	is	little	evidence	for	many	of	the
costs	related	to	the	‘end	of	the	UK	dominance’	in	financial	services	that	has	sometimes	been	claimed.
Another	important	aspect	of	the	divorce	is	the	issue	of	macroeconomic	costs.	Roughly	speaking,	the	more
synchronized	the	business	cycles,	the	higher	is	the	cost	of	a	divorce	since	many	adjustments	will	be	required	to
break	that	harmony.	Moreover,	the	sources	of	volatility	will	be	similar	in	that	case,	which	will	require	policy	alignment
to	counter	them.	As	a	result,	the	divorce	will	be	costly	as	this	alignment	of	policies	will	be	broken.	However,	the
recent	empirical	literature	has	shown	that	UK	regions	are	less	synchronized	with	the	Euro	Area	than	the	rest	of	the
European	Union	(Bandres	et	al,	2017,	Barrios	et	al,	2002).	Moreover,	the	first	study	shows	that	amongst	the	regions
of	EU-16,	the	majority	of	the	UK’s	(and	in	particular	England’s)	is	synchronized	with	those	of	Sweden	and	Finland
only	(Figure	1).	Considering	this,	the	macroeconomic	costs,	including	those	of	policy	misalignment	may	be	very
limited.
Figure	1:	The	clusters	in	the	synchronicity	of	the	business	cycles	across	EU-16	regions.	The	colours	represent	the	different
clusters.	As	can	be	seen,	the	majority	of	the	UK	regions	are	clustered	into	those	of	Sweden	and	Finland	(cluster	4).	See	Bandres
et	al	(2017).
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Source:	Banco	de	Espana	Working	Paper	No.	1702.
The	area	that	has	possibly	received	the	most	attention	in	terms	of	economic	costs	of	a	Brexit	is	related	to	trade,	and
the	disintegration	from	the	common	goods-and	labour	market	(I	leave	services	aside	since	the	level	of	integration	in
services	remains	very	low).	A	priori,	the	costs	of	a	divorce	seem	to	be	highest	here.	On	the	demand-side,	the	costs
arise	from	a	loss	of	access	to	a	major	consumer	market	with	more	than	300	million	consumers,	as	well	as	from	a
potential	drop	in	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI).	On	the	supply	side,	the	costs	originate	from	a	break	in	supplier
relations,	cease	in	access	to	skilled	workforce,	and	a	drop	in	productivity	spillovers	and	human	capital	exchange.	The
magnitude	of	the	costs,	however,	is	not	clear	since	it	depends	on	a	number	of	factors.	First	and	foremost,	it	is
contingent	on	the	exit	trade	deal	(and	bill)	that	the	UK	will	reach	with	the	EU.	Currently,	there	is	a	high	uncertainty
regarding	this	(or	any	other	form	of)	deal.	Hence,	not	much	can	yet	be	said	on	this	aspect.
Secondly,	it	will	depend	on	the	ability	of	the	UK	to	redirect	the	trade	flows	towards	new	partners,	new	deals,	and	new
multilateral	agreements	in	order	to	compensate	for	some	of	the	losses	generated	from	the	EU	divorce.	Finally,	the
cost	will	greatly	depend	on	the	ability	of	UK	to	innovate.	Because,	as	history	has	shown,	the	economies	that	best
survive	structural	breaks	are	those	that	adjust	and	innovate.	And	to	do	that,	you	need	to	look	firmly	ahead	and	have
a	flexible	production	sector	that	can	quickly	switch	to	new	partners	and	trade	models.	In	this	regard,	Germany’s	quick
adjustment	in	export	strategy	during	the	Great	Recession	might	be	the	inspiration	that	is	currently	required.
Whatever	the	outcome	of	the	negotiations,	it	will	take	quite	some	time	before	we	know	the	extent	of	the	final	Brexit
bill.	At	the	moment,	all	the	efforts	should	be	devoted	to	envisioning	a	new	model	for	the	UK	beyond	the	EU.	Because
the	ability	to	adapt	to	the	new	‘normal’	will	be	the	decisive	factor	in	tipping	the	balance	between	the	success	or	failure
of	a	Brexit,	beyond	the	short-term	costs	that	are	inevitable	in	any	structural	breakup.
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This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of		LSE	Brexit	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.	
Eddie	Gerba	(PhD)	is	a	Distinguished	Affiliate	at	the	CES	Ifo	Institute	in	Munich.	He	is	also	a	Visiting	Fellow	at	the
European	Institute	and	has	previously	held	the	position	of	Fellow	in	Macroeconomics	there.
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